Delaware’s Forgotten World War II Hero: Wilmer Earl Gallaher at Midway – Part IV : The Battle of Midway: Rationale and Preliminary Issues
IV. The Battle of Midway: Rationale and Preliminary Issues
Since the Battle of Midway was one of the seminal battles in world history, it is no surprise that there have been many books written and movies made about it, including a documentary actually filmed during the Japanese bombing of Midway Island by celebrated director John Ford. Thus, we will only summarize the basics here and in the next section, focus on Gallaher’s specific role.
The Japanese wanted Midway Island to expand its defensive perimeter, but most importantly, to lure the American fleet into a decisive battle that would force the Americans to negotiate a peace treaty. This plan was put into place earlier than desired due to the Doolitle Raid on 18 April 1942.17 This audacious mission involved land-based B-25 bombers flying from an aircraft carrier, USS Hornet (CV-8), to bomb Japan. It caused little real damage, but was another psychological blow and humiliation to the Japanese.
While the Japanese sank the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV-2) and heavily damaged the carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5) in the Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942, two Japanese carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku, were also heavily damaged and not available for Midway. This meant that there would only be four carriers instead of the planned six. Nonetheless, the Japanese still had a numerical advantage in carriers.
What the Americans did have was advance knowledge of the attack due to their breaking of the Japanese code. Initially, all they knew was the target was “AF”, but weren’t sure what “AF” was. The staff famously devised a stratagem to have Midway feign not having fresh water and report that with an unencrypted message. When they decoded a Japanese message saying, “AF is short of water”, the target identity was confirmed.
Boldly accepting the intelligence as to the time and place of the attack and risking the remaining Pacific aircraft carriers, Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, prepared a plan to station the carriers northeast of Midway. This position would place the smaller American fleet out-of-range of Japanese patrol planes, but allow an attack on the Japanese from an unexpected position.
The other major issue was the status of the Yorktown. As indicated above, she had been heavily damaged at the Coral Sea, but was able to reach Pearl Harbor. The initial estimates were that it would take months to repair her. Nimitz gave the shipyard 72 hours. Amazingly, the yard was able to do enough so that Yorktown was available with Enterprise and Hornet to meet the Japanese. Nonetheless, it would still be four Japanese carriers to three for the Americans.18